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Abstract
We study the reachability problem for systems implemented as feed-forward neu-
ral networks whose activation function is implemented via ReLU functions. We
draw a correspondence between establishing whether some arbitrary output can
ever be outputed by a neural system and linear problems characterising a neural
system of interest. We present a methodology to solve cases of practical interest
by means of a state-of-the-art linear programs solver. We evaluate the technique
presented by discussing the experimental results obtained by analysing reachabil-
ity properties for a number of benchmarks in the literature.
1 Introduction
Over the past ten years, there has been growing interest in trying to verify formally the correctness
of AI systems. This has been compounded by recent public calls for the development of “responsi-
ble” and “verifiable AI” [27]. Indeed, since the development of ever more complex and pervasive
AI systems including autonomous vehicles, the need for higher guarantees of correctness for the
systems has intensified. Formal verification is one of the techniques used in other areas of Computer
Science, including hardware and automatic flight control systems, to debug systems and certify their
correctness. It is therefore expected that formal methods will contribute to provide guarantees that
AI systems behave as intended.
In the area of multi-agent systems (MAS) there already has been considerable activity aimed at
verifyingMAS formally. In one line efficient model checkers for finite state MAS against expressive
AI-based specifications, such as those based on epistemic logic, have been developed [12, 20, 7].
Abstraction techniques have also been put forward to verify infinite state MAS [19] and approaches
for parameterised verification for MAS and swarms have been introduced [15, 14, 16]. In a different
strand of work, theorem proving approaches have been tailored to MAS [1, 28], and techniques for
the direct verification of MAS programs have been put forward [4].
While significant results have been achieved in these lines, their object of study is a system that is
given either via a traditional programming language or a MAS-oriented programming language. It
is however expected that machine learning technology will provide the backbone for a wide range of
AI applications, including robotics, autonomous systems, and AI decision making systems. With the
few exceptions discussed below, at present there is no methodology for the verification of systems
based on neural networks. This paper aims to make a contribution on this topic.
To begin this investigation, we consider feed-forward neural-networks (FFNNs) only, possibly with
several layers, where the activation function is governed by ReLU functions [9, 24]. We consider
specifications concerning safety only and, in particular, we study reachability. The method we
present enables us to check whether a particular output, perhaps representing a bug, is ever produced
by a given neural-network. While the target specifications are comparatively simpler than present
research in MAS and reactive systems, reachability remains of paramount importance in program
analysis as it enables the identification of simple errors.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we fix the notation on ReLU-based
FFNNs and mixed integer linear programs. In Section 3, we present an encoding of neural-networks
in terms of linear programs and formally relate reachability on FFNNs in terms of a corresponding
linear programming problem. In Section 4, we apply the technique to a pole-balancing problem from
the literature and identify safety features of the corresponding FFNNs. In Section 5, we evaluate the
scalability of the approach by presenting experimental results obtained on FFNNs of various sizes.
We conclude in Section 6 by discussing further work.
RelatedWork. As stated above, much of the past and present research on verification of AI systems
concerns the analysis of actual programs or traditional finite-state models representing AI systems
against temporal or AI-based specifications. While the aims are the same as those in this paper, the
object of study is intrinsically different. In contrast, much of the literature on FFNNs is concerned
with training and performance and does not address the formal verification question. Currently
techniques used for checking the correctness of networks rely on test datasets which are probablistic
and thus obviously incomplete. The few exceptions for formal verification of neural networks that
we are aware of are the following.
[17] advocates the use of safety specifications to validate neural networks. The work here presented
on reachability partially falls within the types 3 and 4 of safety which they discuss. While the broad
direction of the work is in line with what pursued here, no actual verification method is discussed.
A method for finding adversarial inputs for ReLU feed forward networks through the use of linear
programming was proposed in [3]. However, the LP encoding proposed there is tailored to adversar-
ial inputs and cannot be applied to reachability. Moreover, finding adversarial inputs can be thought
of as a special case of reachability where the input set is constrained with respect to a specific input;
thus the formulation here proposed is more general. Related to this, a method for finding adversar-
ial inputs using a layer-by-layer approach and employing SMT solvers was recently proposed [11].
This technique supports any activation function, not just ReLU as we do here. However, because the
focus is on adversarial inputs, as before, the method seems not immediately generilisable to solving
reachability on feed-forward networks. A methodology for the analysis of ReLU feed-forward net-
works, conducted independently from this research, was made available on ArXiv some time before
this submission [13]. While the aims seem largely in line as those presented here, there is no formal
correspondence presented between reachability analysis and linear programs as we do here. More-
over, the underlying techniques proposed are different. While their method is based on SMT-solving,
we only use linear programming here. Linear programming is used in [13] as a comparison against
SMT, but there is no mention of any optimisation on the LP engine. In contrast, we here focus on
an efficient LP translation and handle floating point operations in an optimised manner. Also the
scenarios studied are different from ours and are not released for a comparison. Judging from the
experimental results presented for the LP comparison, the LP technique used in [13] performs sig-
nificantly less efficiently than what we develop here. For example, their analysis is only shown with
up to 300 ReLU constraints whereas our technique is able to handle more than 500 with ease. An
in-depth comparison of the performance of the two different techniques will not be possible until all
data in [13] are released.
2 Preliminaries
In what follows we fix the notation on the key concepts to be used in the rest of the paper.
Feed-forward neural networks (FFNN) are the simplest class of neural networks [10]. Their main
distinguishing feature is the lack of cycles.
Definition 1 [Feed-Forward Neural Network] Let V be a set of vertices, E ⊆ V × V be a set
of edges, w : E → R be a edge weight function and b : V → R be a bias function. A weighted,
directed, acyclic graphN = (V,E,w, b) is a feed-forward neural network if the following properties
hold:
1. For j = 1 . . . n there exists an ordered collection of ordered sets L(j) ⊆ V known as layers
such that V =
⊎n
j=1 L
(j) and for a vertex v ∈ L(j) j < n, the set of endpoints for edges
originating from v is equal to L(j+1) and for a vertex v ∈ L(n), the set of endpoints from v
is equal to the empty set.
2. Each L(j), j ≥ 2 is associated with a function σ(j) : R → R known as the activation
function.
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In this paper we consider only ReLU activation functions. This function has grown in popularity
over the past few years in feed-forward networks, replacing the sigmoid and tanh functions; this
is due to the improvement in convergence to the function being approximated when training the
network. It is defined as ReLU(x) = max(x, 0).
While the network itself is a weighted graph with bias represented as a function, we can define the
traditional vector and matrix representation of bias and weights respectively.
Definition 2 [Bias and weights of layer] For each layer L(k), k ≥ 2 of a neural network N , we
define the bias vector to be the vector b(k) ∈ Rm with m = |L(k)| defined elementwise as: b
(k)
i =
b(L
(k)
i ). We further define the weight matrix to be the matrixW
(k) ∈ Rm×n with m = |L(k)| and
n = |L(k−1)| defined elementwise as: W
(k)
ij = w(L
(k−1)
j , L
(k)
i ).
The main use of neural networks is as universal function approximators. For the purposes of this
paper, we define the function computed by a network.
Definition 3 [Function computed by network] LetN be a neural network and 2 ≤ i ≤ k with k the
number of layers in N . Then, layer L(i) defines a function f (i) : Rm → Rn known as a computed
function where m = |L(i−1)|, n = |L(i)| and defined as f (i)(x) = σ(i)(W (i)x + b(i)) Further, N
defines a function f : Rm → Rn known as the computed function where m = |L(1)|, n = |L(k)|
and defined as: f(x) = f (k)(f (k−1)(...(f (2)(x))))
Linear Programming is an optimisation technique where the objective function and constraints
are linear. Efficient algorithms exist to solve linear programming problems efficiently [30]. For
the purposes of this paper consider mixed integer linear programs; these are linear programs which
contain both real and integer variables.
Definition 4 [Mixed Integer Linear Programs] A function f(x1, ..., xn) is said to be linear if for
some c ∈ RN , we have f(x1, ..., xn) =
∑N
i=1 cixi.
For any linear function f(x1, ..., xn), and any b ∈ R, f(x1, ..., xn) = b, f(x1, ..., xn) ≤ b and
f(x1, ..., xn) ≥ b are said to be linear constraints.
A linear program (LP) is a mathematical optimisation problem where the the objective function is
linear and the constraints on the variables of the objective function are linear.
A mixed integer linear program is a linear program which allows for constraints which require
variables to be integer, i.e., constraints of the type xi ∈ Z.
In this paper we use Gurobi linear programming solver [8]. Gurobi has good performance and can
be used on a wide range of problems [22].
3 Verifying Reachability for FFNN
In this paper we focus on reachability analysis, a particular aspect of safety analysis.
In general terms reachability analysis consists on finding whether a certain state (or set of states)
of a system can be reached given a fixed set of initial states of the system. Reachability analysis is
commonly used to identify bugs in software systems, e.g., whether mutual exclusion is enforced in
concurrent applications [21].
To apply this concept to neural networks, we treat our fixed set of initial states to be a fixed set
of input vectors and we attempt to find out whether any vector in a set of output vectors can be
computed by the network from a vector in the input set.
Definition 5 [Reachability for FFNN.] SupposeN is an FFNN with computing function f : Rm →
Rn withm = |L(1)|, n = |L(k)|, where k is the number of layers in N .
Let I ⊆ Rm and O ⊆ Rn. We say thatO is reachable from I usingN if ∃y ∈ O, ∃x ∈ I, f(x) = y.
While Definition 5 presents the general case, we here focus on input and output sets that are repre-
sentable via a finite number of linear constraints on Rn. Observe this still enables us to capture a
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large number of systems since all linear equalities and disequalities are allowed e.g. verification of
ACAS networks performed on in [13] uses linearly definable input and output sets.
Definition 6 [Linearly Definable Set.] Let S ⊆ Rn. We say that S is linearly defineable if there
exists a finite set of linear constraintsCS such that S = {x ∈ Rn | x satifies every constraint in CS}.
We define CS to be the constraint set of S.
We now show that estabilishing reachability for a neural network with ReLU activation functions
can be rephrased into solving a corresponding linear program resulting from the linear encoding of
the neural network in question.
While informal linear encodings for individual neurons have been proposed in the past [13], the one
we present here is a formal one which operates on a layer by layer approach. Moreover, it only
utilises a single binary variable; as we demonstrate later, this is important for efficiency in practical
applications.
Definition 7 [Linear Encoding for FFNN.] LetN be an FFNN and 2 ≤ i ≤ k with k the number of
layers inN . Suppose further x(i−1) and x(i) are vectors of real (LP) variables representing the input
and output of layer i respectively and δ(i) a vector of binary (LP) variables. Then, the set of linear
constraints encoding layer i, (with a ReLU activation function) is defined as:
Ci = {x
(i)
j ≥W
(i)
j x
(i−1) + b
(i)
j , x
(i)
j ≤W
(i)
j x
(i−1) + b
(i)
j +Mδ
(i)
j ,
x
(i)
j ≥ 0, x
(i)
j ≤M(1− δ
(i)
j ) | j = 1...|L
(i)|}
whereM a "sufficiently large" constant.
We can define the set of linear constraints encoding the network as C = ∪ki=2Ci.
By means of this encoding, we can reduce reachability analysis to solving a linear program defined
on these constraints.
Definition 8 [LP encoding reachability for FFNN.] Let N be an FFNN, C its encoding as per Defi-
nition 7, and I ⊆ Rm (respectively, O ⊆ Rn) be a set of linearly definable network inputs (outputs,
respectively).
The linear program encoding the reachability of O from I through N is given by the objective
function z = 0 and constraintsCreach = Cin∪C∪Cout, with the sign of the variables unconstrained,
where
• Cin is a constraint set for I defined on the same variables used in the encoding of the input
to the second layer of N (i.e. x
(1)
j for j = 1...m), and
• Cout is a constraint set for O defined on the same variables used in the encoding of the
output of the last layer of N (i.e. x
(k)
j for j = 1...n).
Theorem 1 [Equivalence between reachability analysis and corresponding LP problems.] Suppose
N is an FFNN on linearly definable input I and outputO. LetL be the corresponding linear problem
encoding the reachability of O from I throughN (Definition 8).
Then, O is reachable from I throughN if and only if the linear program L has a feasible solution x.
Proof sketch. =⇒ We have ∃x ∈ I, ∃y ∈ O with f(x) = y. Then, for the assignment of LP
variables x
(1)
j → xj and x
(i)
j → f
(i)(...(f (2)(xj))), we have that the LP is feasible.
⇐= We have x is a feasible solution for L. Let xj = x
(1)
j and yj = x
(k)
j . Then, we have
x ∈ I, y ∈ O and y = f(x) by definition of the LP.
4 Verifying a Neural Controller for the Inverted Cart Problem
We now use the methodology developed in the previous section to verify several reachability speci-
fications on the well-studied inverted pendulum controller problem [2].
4
Inverted pendulum on cart problem (IPCP). The system is composed by a cart moving along a
frictionless track with bounds at either ends of the track. Attached to the centre of the cart through
the use of a frictionless and unactuated joint is a pole. The pole acts as an inverted pendulum.
The problem can be expressed in control terms by using two state variables and their derivatives [2].
• Position of the cart on the track, denoted by x and bounded by ±2.4.
• Speed of the cart, denoted by x˙ and unbounded.
• Angle of the pendulum (counter-clockwise), denoted by θ and bounded by ±15◦.
• Angular velocity of the pendulum (counter-clockwise), denoted by θ˙ and unbounded.
The output of the controller at every discrete time step is a signal for the application of a force of
+10N or −10N (where the direction is aligned with x). Intuitively, the aim of the controller is to
balance the pendulum on the cart for as long as possible while, at the same time, remaining both in
the bounds of the track and in the bounds of the angle of the pendulum.
A neural network controller for the IPCP. Due to its inherent non-linearity, the IPCP traditional
controller methods cannot be used to solve the problem. Reinforcement learning methods can be
used to derive a neural network that can be used as a controller for the system. To create a neu-
ral controller we used the deep learning library KERAS [5] combined with the Q-learning library
KERAS-RL [25].
The precise details of the resulting network and the training data are not relevant for what follows
(the supplementary material reports the details). After training the resulting deep, feed-forward
neural network obtained can be described as follows:
• The input layer consists of 4 input nodes, one for each of the variables of the system.
• The resulting three hidden layers consist of 16 nodes; each layer uses the ReLU activation
function.
• The output layer consists of 2 nodes denoting the "q-value" of moving left and right respec-
tively. The higher the q-value, the higher is the predicted reward for the action. The output
layer does not use a ReLU function as is standard for most networks.
Reachability via Linear Programming. Having derived a neural-network controller for the IPCP,
we now proceed to analyse it in terms of reachability properties. While the theoretical encoding of
the problem is presented in Section 3, to solve the resulting problem via an automatic solver, we
need to address the resulting issues in terms of floating point approximations.
Floating point arithmetic. For the encoding to be correct, the constraints present in the resulting LP
must take into account a safe level of floating point precision and use tolerances when defining the
links between the layers. Not doing so may render the analysis to be unsound. A system may be
assessed to be safe (i.e., unwanted regions of the output may be shown to be unreachable); but this
could be the result of by approximations (roundings or truncations) due to the underlying floating
point arithmetic.
To address this issue we use we use "epsilon" terms when encoding the network. These are terms
used to link the layers of the network to allow for small perturbations when invoking the linear
program solver. In combination with this, we change the objective function to minimise the sum of
these epsilon terms, instead of simply using the constant 0.
Formally, for each layer, the constraint set changes as follows:
Ci = {x
(i)
j ≥W
(i)
j x
(i−1) + b
(i)
j − ǫ
(i)
j , x
(i)
j ≤W
(i)
j x
(i−1) + b
(i)
j +Mδ
(i)
j + ǫ
(i)
j ,
x
(i)
j ≥ 0, x
(i)
j ≤M(1− δ
(i)
j ) | j = 1...|L
(i)|}
where ǫj are non-negative variables. Correspondingly, when encoding a neural network as linear
program, we change the objective function to be z =
∑k
i=2
∑|L(i)|
j=1 ǫ
(i)
j , which we then aim to
minimise.
This entails that we aim to find an exact solution if possible but, if one exists with a small epsilon
sum, we can still accept it if it is within the tolerance of the underlying floating point arithmetic. We
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do this by adding a further constraint of the form
∑k
i=2
∑|L(i)|
j=1 ǫ
(i)
j ≤ t, where t is the tolerance
term.
In practice, for current computers we can take this to be 1e−6 which is one order of magnitude larger
than the machine epsilon for 32-bit floating point numbers. We adopted this value in our experiments.
However, when binary inputs are used, a larger tolerance value may be required because of the
techniques used by solvers. We adopted a value of 1e−4 for these problems.
Reachability specifications and results. In view of the encoding discussed above we can now
proceed to verify the behaviour of the neural-network trained for the IPCP.We consider the following
specifications where in each case S is a tupe of form (x, x˙, θ, θ˙).
1. Is it ever the case that Q(S, 10)  Q(S,−10) + 100 where S = (0, 0,−5, 0)? Intuitively,
this says that force of 10N has a Q-reward of at least 100 units greater than −10N for
the given state S. This expresses the fact the controller attempts (in the strongest possible
sense within the bounds of the problem) to move the cart to the right when the pendulum is
leaning to the right and all other factors are unimportant.
2. Is it ever the case that Q(S, 10)  Q(S,−10) + 100 where S ∈ {(x, x˙, θ, θ˙) | |x| ≤
0.5, |x˙| ≤ 0.2,−5 ≤ θ ≤ −4, |θ˙| ≤ 0.1}? This is the same specification as above but to be
checked on a larger states of configurations.
3. Is it ever the case thatQ(S, 10)  Q(S,−10)+10where S ∈ {(x, x˙, θ, θ˙) | x ≤ −2, |x˙|≤
0.2,−2 ≤ θ ≤ −1.5, |θ˙| ≤ 0.25}? This represents the fact that the controller attempts to
move the cart to the right when the pendulum is not at risk from falling over but the cart is
almost out of left hand side track bound.
4. Is it ever the case thatQ(S, 10)  Q(S,−10)+10where S ∈ {(x, x˙, θ, θ˙) | x ≤ −2, |x˙|≤
0.4,−2 ≤ θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ θ˙ ≤ 0.1}? This is a relaxation of the above specification to analyse
a larger set of configurations.
To analyse the specifications above we compiled the network for the IPCP into an LP as described
above. We then used Gurobi [8] to solve the corresponding LP problems. A solution found by
Gurobi corresponds to the fact that there is a configuration can be found solving the problem. In this
case, the specification can be met by the system for the values found. If a solution cannot be found,
since by Theorem 1 the method is complete, we conclude that no input in the space analysed can
produce the output checked.
Doing as above we promptly obtained the following results (full benchmarks are reported in the next
section).
1. No solution could be found satisfying the constraints on the input and output of the network.
We conclude that our synthesised controller does strongly prefer to apply 10N to balance
the pendulum in those circumstances.
2. As above no solution could be found. Again, we conclude that in all the region explored
the behaviour of the synthesised controller is correct.
3. Again, no solution could be found satisfying both the inputs and the outputs. This indicates
that the controller attempts to return the cart to the centre of the track when it is one side of
the track within the range of parameters above.
4. The solver reported the solution x = (−2.0,−0.4,−0.15, 0.1) (approximation shown) for
the problem above. This shows that the controller applies the force in what is, intuitively,
the incorrect direction when the configuration of the system is as above. Note also that in
this situation the angle of the pendulum would also suggest an application of the force in
the positive direction.
The analysis conducted above shows that the synthesised controller does not satisfy our specifica-
tions as put forward. The values found by the solver can be fed to the neural network to confirm the
result. We have effectively found a “bug” in the synthesised controller by using a formal encoding
into an LP problem.
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We stress the importance of this result which enabled us to find an error in the resulting network in
under 1s. Comparable techniques, e.g., testing are in incomplete and may take considerably longer
to identify the need for further training.
5 Experimental Results
We now report on the experimental results obtained by using the technique presented in the previous
sections on a number of feed-forward networks. The experiments were run on an Intel Core i7-
4790 CPU (3.600GHz, 8 cores) running Linux kernel 4.4 upon which we invoked Gurobi version
7.0. The benchmarks are shown only to evaluate the scalability of the approach, not as validation
for the corresponding problems. Indeed, for some of the problems below (Reuters and MNIST),
reachability analysis is not applicable. Moreover, since, as discussed in the Introduction, no other
approach exists for reachability analysis, we are unable to compare our results to other techniques.
More details on all of these experiments as well as the networks and the code used to perform
verification can be found in the supplementary material of this paper.
Problem Layer Sizes Vars (Continuous, Binary) Time (s)
Inv. Pen. 1
4, 16, 16, 16, 2
108, 31 >0.01
Inv. Pen. 2 140, 39 0.02
Inv. Pen. 3 142, 41 0.03
Inv. Pen. 4 143, 42 0.04
Mountain Car 1
2, 50, 190, 3
406, 117 0.06
Mountain Car 2 404, 115 0.04
Mountain Car 3 404, 117 0.02
Mountain Car 4 407, 118 0.04
Pendulum 1
3, 32, 32, 32, 1
154, 41 0.05
Pendulum 2 154, 41 0.02
Pendulum 3 154, 41 0.02
Pendulum 4 161, 48 0.65
Acrobot 1
6, 64, 168, 3
579, 162 0.48 (3 problems)
Acrobot 2 569, 152 0.66 (3 problems)
Acrobot 3 590, 173 3.31
Acrobot 4 609, 192 47.28
Reuters 1000, 512, 46 1546, 526 40.30
MNIST 4608, 128, 10 5002, 128 8.54
Table 1: Experimental results for the three neural networks described. Vars column refers to the
number of variables in the LP: both continuous and binary.
Inverted pendulum. The neural network’s description for this scenario, including its size and ar-
chitecture, is described in Section 4. As reported in Table 5, the method here proposed solved each
reachability query in less than 1 sec. We checked several other reachability specifications, here not
reported, to evaluate the performance degradation as a function of the specification. We could not
find specifications that could not be solved in under 1 sec. We conclude that the methodology pre-
sented can be used to evaluate any reachability problem for the IPCP controller as here synthesised.
Acrobot, Pendulum and Mountain Car. These are well-known problems from classic control the-
ory [29, 6, 23]. As with the inverted pendulumproblem, we trained agent networks which solve these
problems and evaluated specifications using our toolkit. For the acrobot and pendulum problems, the
networks rely on non-linear trigonometric functions; we generate a piece-wise linear approximation
for these.
The specifications verified in the Pendulum and Mountain Car benchmarks but with networks which
are both larger and have different layer sizes.
Similarly to the case above, the time taken to perform verification was less than 1 sec. Differently
from the pendulum case, the specifications verified for the acrobot problem are much more complex
(mirroring the problem itself); consequently the specifications took up to 45 sec to be verified. The
third and fourth specifications for acrobot are especially demanding as they require a full search of
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a large part of a relatively high dimension state space to find a solution. Taking this into account, we
believe the performance to be more than acceptable.
Reuters text classification. This neural network is intended to solve the problem of classifying
articles from their content [26]. The network is composed of a binary input layer followed by a
hidden layer with a ReLU activation function followed by the output layer. The structure of network
is thus rather shallow, but contains a large number of input and hidden neurons.
To evaluate the performance of the approach, we fixed all but 50 of the inputs to known values and
attempted to carry out reachability analysis on the remaining inputs. We also neglected the use of
the softmax function to reduce the complexity resulting from its use.
We were able to replicate the existence of an input for a (pre-softmax) output of the network for
which we knew that a binary input existed. We were able to solve the LP problem and find the
corresponding values in just under 45 secs. As above, considering the size of the hidden layers and
the number of binary variables present in the corresponding problem, we find the performance to be
attractive.
MNIST Image Recognition. This neural network was put forward to perform image recognition
on the MNSIT handwritten numeric digits dataset [18]. The network is composed of a convolutional
part with several filters and a max-pooling layer followed by a hidden feed-forward layer and an
output layer.
We only considered the hidden and output layers of the network as these are the feed-forward portion
of the network. As in the previous example the size of these layers is between 102 and 103 nodes.
As in the previous experiment we attempted to find an input for some output for which we know an
input exists. As before, we did not use softmax function when encoding the output.
The toolkit was able to find the input in just over 2 secs. Given the size of the network and the
number of variables in the corresponding problem, we again evaluate the performance positively.
Comparing the last two scenarios, we conjecture that the large increase of binary variables in the
problem caused by the binary constraints on the input creates the large performance gap between
the Reuters dataset and MNIST.
In summary the results suggest that the methodology developed, when paired with the optimisations
here studied, can solve the reachability problem for several neural networks of interest. In particular
we were able to solve reachability analysis for deep nets of 3 layers of significant size. The ex-
periments demonstrate that performance depends on a number of factors the most important being
the size of the state space searched, the number of variables (especially binary variables), and the
number of constraints.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have observed that while there is increasing awareness that future society critical
AI systems will need to be verifiable, all of the major verification techniques fail to target neural
networks. Yet, neural networks are presently forecast to drive most future AI systems. We have
attempted to begin to fill this gap by providing a methodology for studying reachability analysis
in feed forward neural networks. Specifically, we have drawn a formal correspondence between
reachability in a neural network and an associated linear programming problem. We have presented
how to circumvent problems caused by floating point arithmetic and optimise the corresponding
linear programming problem. The experimental results shown demonstrate that the method can
solve reachability for networks of significant size.
Much work remains to do in this direction. We intend to study recurrent networks and develop
alternative techniques to solve the reachability problem in recurrent networks. Also we intend to
apply the results of this work to synthesised controllers in engineering.
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